Privatisation of Public Utility Lands in Southern Kenya

By A. Mijnlieff

STUDY AREA: MAJI MOTO

Policies regarding land in Kenya have largely been directed towards privatisation for the last fifty years, following by and large Western traditions of land management predicated on sedentary farming practices. Despite being at odds with customary pastoralist Maasai practices which developed as a strategy to adapt to the harsh semi-arid climates of Southern Kenya and Northern Tanzania, land privatisation with the view of including the Maasai in wider economic system, sedentarising them, and by ambiguously ‘improving their economic and personal wellbeing’ is still a popular policy.

These policies have their roots in the Colonial period, when large areas of Maasailand were designated as ‘protected areas’, the legacy of which is visible today in parks such as the Maasai Mara. While protecting wildlife, creating such parks meant the Maasai lost up to one half of their common territories, much of which was prime grazing land. Privatisation began in earnest in 1964, after Kenyan independence, with the installation of ‘Group Ranches’ (GR), of which Maji Moto is one. This policy aimed to sedentarise the nomadic pastoralists, and arose from the notion that agro-pastoralism and Euro/North American style farming was preferable, as it was more economically productive.  The project was funded by the World Bank and USAID, who from an ideological perspective also preferred individual property rights.

The GRs, as was the case with the Maji Moto Group Ranch (MMGR), were parcels of land owned communally by those registered as belonging to it. They were, and still are, managed by an elected committee of GR members. The privatisation of the GR land continued into the 1980s when government policies, again sponsored by the Bretton Woods institutions, with the subdivision into individual plots. In the case of Maji Moto this was encouraged by those living there, as it was believed that it would give people a chance to diversify and improve their livelihoods, additionally people were frustrated with the management of the ranch in a communal manner.

The subdivision of land meant that certain plots were designated as ‘public utility sites’. In two ways then can this phase of the land privatisation process be seen as climate change adaptation strategy. Firstly the allocation of land parcels can be seen as an alternative way of increasing or diversifying your livelihoods opportunity. By owning land, a Maasai can take out a loan against that land or even sell it in hard times, or the land can be cultivated. By not putting all your eggs in one basket, your vulnerability is reduced. For instance, it should protect people against drought which kills many cattle. Secondly, setting aside land for public utility use, means that that the profit accrued from these sites are supposed to be for communal benefit, and that the sites cannot be sold or used as collateral for a loan. Key plots include several schools, sites set aside for a medical facility, and for urban development. One major plot is for Olarro Lodge, which covers approximately 110 acres. This site is noteworthy, as covers a large amount of land, and is used as a luxury resort for tourists wishing to see local wildlife. The company, paid rent directly to the MMGR, paying additional amounts for each filled bed. The income gained from the Olarro-MMGR relationship fed into the schooling system, which is highly important as Maji Moto has some of the lowest levels of education in comparison to neighbouring GR’s. In this way the MMGR community had been able to make a profit from the privatisation of land, as it allowed for the generation of money, and the development of public goods (e.g. schools) through private investors.

These examples illustrate how land privatisation can be used an adaptation strategy: by reducing vulnerability in various ways, livelihoods can become diversified or more stable, providing people with more tools to adapt to a drying climate. However, the formalisation and institutionalisation of privatising land has led to a number of new, unforeseen, dynamics in Maji Moto. This predominantly relates to the grabbing of lands through vaguely legal, and illegal means. The land titles of sites previously designated as ‘public utility sites’ have been grabbed by members of the MMGR committee and their families. Furthermore, the Olarro Lodge site titles have also been grabbed, meaning that profits derived from the lease of the land no longer have to go to the community. The consequences are not yet fully realised, as grabbing has only recently come to light, however tensions in the community have been rising, leading in at least one case to violence. New forms of cooperation are also present, but perhaps less visibly or positively, for instance the collaboration required for the title grabbing to occur. 

RESEARCH

This research’ overarching aim was to investigate the new dynamics of conflict and cooperation as a consequence of the privatisation of land, as an adaptation strategy, leading to the conditions allowing for the grabbing of public utility land titles. To achieve this the research first identified who is affected by the grabbing of public utility land titles, who is grabbing land, and with what motivations. Secondly, we investigated what the effect the land grabbing has on the adaptive capacity of those identified - looking into who has benefited and who has lost out from land privatisation. Thirdly, a social capital framework was used as a tool to understand the social dynamics created by the land privatisation, researching the levels of bonding and bridging social capital before and after its implementation of those stakeholders involved in the grabbing of land. By employing social capital theory, the research looked into conflict and cooperation between and within stakeholder groups which has been generated by the grabbing of public utility land titles. Having gathered this data, conclusions are made regarding the consequences, relating to social dynamics, of land privatisation as an adaptation strategy, focusing on how such projects can be made more inclusive. 

research findings

• The institutionalisation of the subdivision of land and allocation of land titles have weakened bonding social capital between agro-pastoralists, as the need to work together and depend on each other has been reduced because land use is more individualised.
•  As a secondary consequence of formal land privatisation, public utility lands were able to be grabbed. It is this research’ contention that this is a reason for, and a result of low bridging social capital between those who have competing claims on the land, such as pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. This has in turn led to and increased propensity for conflict between the different land users.
• Privatisation of land, allowing for the existence of public utility land sites, need to build levels of bridging social capital, in order to avoid negative consequences of competing claims leading to exclusion and conflict between land users resulting from most importantly land grabbing.